

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Dr Yezid Sayigh for his detailed comments on various drafts of this paper and the Saudi Committee for the Development of International Trade, Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, for facilitating his visit to Saudi Arabia.

All online material was accessible on 1 June 2002

Introduction

- ¹ Use of the term 'the Gulf' is meant to be neutral. Iranians are adamant that the body of water they share should be called 'the Persian Gulf', while Arabs are equally insistent that the name should be 'the Arabian Gulf'.
- ² The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 with six members: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.
- ³ Monthly survey of oil

production for December 2001, *Reuters*, 7 January 2002.

- ⁴ US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Annual 2000* (April 2002), as posted at www.eia.doe.gov/iea.
- ⁵ US White House, *Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group* (Washington, May 2001), p. 8–4 (also posted online at www.whitehouse.gov/energy).
- ⁶ *BP AMOCO Statistical Review of World Energy 2001* (June 2001), p. 4.
- ⁷ Saudi Arabia Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, 'Direction of Crude Oil Exports 1981–1998' (online at http://www.mopm.gov.sa/html/en/s_tables/energy-st-9_e_2000.html). Other regions of the world constitute only minor destinations.
- ⁸ The Kingdom reckons its excess capacity at roughly 2 mbd. Information received by author in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.
- ⁹ Information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.

Chapter 1

- ¹ Former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal Al Saud told American television on 3 February 2002 that Saudi Arabia had been pushing the United States to help internal Iraqi forces to overthrow Saddam since 1999, but he warned that an invasion of Iraq would be counterproductive. *Associated Press* (AP), 3 February 2002.
- ² The Saudi diplomat Muhammad Khilawi, who sought political asylum in the United States in 1994, claimed to have documents alleging that Saudi Arabia had bankrolled Pakistan's bomb project since the 1970s, and that the two countries also signed a pact that provided for Pakistani use of its nuclear arsenal against any country attacking the Kingdom with nuclear weapons. *Sunday Times* (London), 24 July 1994. After Prince Sultan visited Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear facilities in May 1999, reports of Saudi intention to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan were swiftly denied by both countries. *Reuters*, 5 and 6 August 1999.
- ³ Members of ruling families throughout the Gulf often go to Pakistan to hunt and many have built residences there. One example of the special privileges these individuals receive occurred in 1994 when the press reported that Pakistan provided special permits so they could hunt the nearly extinct *houbara* bustard in Baluchistan. *Reuters*, 8 December 1994.
- ⁴ *Reuters*, 8 June and 25 and 27 October 1998; *Agence France-Press* (AFP), 26 October 1998.
- ⁵ *Reuters*, 25, 26 and 27 October 1999.
- ⁶ AP, 10 December 2000. Musharraf visited Saudi Arabia a few months later to perform the *haj* (the Islamic pilgrimage) as well as to conduct talks with Saudi leaders. *Reuters*, 28 February 2001.
- ⁷ This may not have included some 3,000 pilots and technicians seconded under other programmes or recruited privately. *Economist*, 21 March and 12 December 1987; *Washington Post*, 28 November 1987; and US Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 3 December 1987, from the *Saudi Press Agency* (SPA), Riyadh, 2 December 1987.
- ⁸ FBIS MENA, 23 August 1988, from the Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu, 22 August 1988; FBIS MENA, 31 August 1988, from the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency, Tehran, in English, 29 August 1988.
- ⁹ It was alleged during the 1999 Kargil crisis that the Saudis persuaded Pakistan to withdraw its forces behind the Line of Control. *The Hindu*, 9 July 1999.
- ¹⁰ As of 1988, the Saudi government announced it had donated 445m Saudi riyals (approximately \$120m) in aid to Afghanistan, although this figure appeared to refer to humanitarian aid only. FBIS MENA, 6 January 1988, from SPA, 4 January 1988.
- ¹¹ One scholar estimates that about 12,000 young Saudis went to Afghanistan and that perhaps 5,000 of these were properly trained and saw combat.

Gwenn Okruhlik, 'Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia', *MERIP Press Information Note*, no. 73 (24 October 2001).

- ¹² *Middle East Economic Digest* (MEED), 26 March 1993; Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington DC, *Newsletter*, April 1993.
- ¹³ Riyadh's motivation for recognising the Taliban government appeared to be the furtherance of a viable central government in Afghanistan after years of anarchy. A newspaper report claimed 'Saudi Arabia's major charity' (unnamed) provided an estimated \$2m annually in aid to Afghanistan and funded two universities, six health clinics, and supported 4,000 orphans. *Washington Post*, 15 October 2001. Why did the Kingdom fail to sever relations with the Taliban regime after the closeness of its relationship with bin Laden became clear? As Prince Turki al-Faisal, the head of Saudi intelligence until October 2001, explained it to an American reporter, he had reached agreement with Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar that Osama bin Laden would be surrendered. But Omar reneged after the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Prince Turki said that the Kingdom had maintained minimal relations with the Taliban despite bin Laden's apparent involvement in the bombings in order to 'leave a door open' for a Taliban change of heart. *New York Times*, 27 December 2001. Prince Turki said in a later interview that the Kingdom did not break off

relations with the Taliban after they reneged on their promise to hand over bin Laden because 'we wanted at least to leave some tenuous link with them in case we needed to talk to them'. AP, 12 February 2002.

- ¹⁴ The Kingdom announced on 22 September 1998 it was recalling its *chargé d'affaires* from Afghanistan and had asked the Afghan *chargé d'affaires* to leave Riyadh 'in keeping with national interests'. *Reuters*, 22 September 1998. Some sources contend that the Saudis actually were content to leave Osama in Afghanistan, given his earlier and allegedly continuing relationship with Saudi intelligence. See, *inter alia*, Ahmad Rashid, 'The Taliban: Exporting Extremism', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 6 (November–December 1999), p. 35.
- ¹⁵ *Reuters*, 1 May 2000.
- ¹⁶ Quoted in *Washington Post*, 15 October 2001. At the same time, the United States seemed more concerned with containing Iran and apparently viewed the Sunni extremism of the Taliban as a useful counter. *Ibid.* Another prominent member of the Al Saud noted that 'when the Taliban took over, Saudi Arabia – and even the United States – saw them as a ray of hope. Having Taliban in power meant that there would be centralized government and complete control over the nation. We thought that we might be able to discuss matters with the Taliban. This was all done in coordination with the United States. So if there is any blame to be placed, it should not be on Saudi Arabia alone,

because the US was seriously involved as well. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates all maintained communication with the Taliban, because we hoped that we would be able to accomplish something with them in the future. As former head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki al-Faisal, has indicated, we had relations with the Taliban because there was hope that they would hand over bin Laden'. Interview with Prince al-Walid bin Talal in *Middle East Insight* (January–February 2002).

¹⁷ Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal told reporters on 26 September 2001 that 'it is the duty of all of us to stand against the perpetrators of those abhorrent acts in the United States', but added that the money spent on a military campaign could be better used for aid for Afghanistan and that, if the United States was not careful with its first military strike, it could have a catastrophic effect. *Reuters*, 26 September 2001. Saudi disquiet was echoed elsewhere in the Gulf. The Saudi Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, subsequently told reporters on 14 October that 'We had hoped that the United States would have been able to extract the terrorists in Afghanistan without resorting to what has happened, because there are innocents who have no guilt, and the people of Afghanistan as a whole have no responsibility for [attacks on the US] ... This situation does not please us at all, but that doesn't mean in any way that we won't fight with all our efforts to uproot terrorism.' AP and *Reuters*, 15 October 2001. At the time of writing, the United States government still had not released any hard evidence of the guilt of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the 11 September hijackings, although a videotape of Osama's meeting with another 'Arab Afghan' from Saudi Arabia, discovered in the aftermath of the American attack on Afghanistan and released by the US Department of Defence on 13 December 2001, appeared to 'prove' guilt. *Washington Post*, 13 December 2001. The poor quality of the tape and various internal inconsistencies, along with its release by the American government, however, led many Muslims to doubt its veracity. Saudi dissident cleric Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shu'aybi was quoted as claiming that 'This is a dubbed tape and is not real at all'. *Reuters*, 16 December 2001. But the Saudi government had no doubts, as shown by the statement of the Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who announced that it 'displays the cruel and inhumane face of a murderous criminal who has no respect for the sanctity of human life'. *Ibid.* Early reports that the Saudi visiting bin Laden and speaking on the videotape was a religious scholar were incorrect, and Saudi sources soon identified him as Khalid Awdah Muhammad al-Harbi, a legless 'Arab Afghan' who had also fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. *Reuters*, 16 December 2001; *Washington Post*, 17 December 2001.

- ¹⁸ *Reuters*, 19 and 21 January 2002.
- ¹⁹ This does not mean that the desire for GCC–Egyptian cooperation is dead. For example, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence Sheikh Jabir al-Hamad Al Sabah told a Kuwaiti newspaper on 9 July 2001 that Egypt ‘could directly participate in implementing the joint Gulf defence pact’ and there was some speculation that Egypt could be linked to GCC command and control operations. *Reuters*, 9 July 2001.
- ²⁰ *Reuters*, 4 December 2000. In March 2001, the Saudi government announced that it had given \$2.37bn in aid to the Palestinians since 1991. *Reuters*, 20 March 2001.
- ²¹ One could posit that problems between the two countries date back to the war they fought in 1934, when Saudi forces took control of the provinces of Asir, Najran and Jizan.
- ²² Although the Saudis were pressured to withdraw in 1955, their claims to Buraimi, also known within the UAE as al-Ayn, were not dropped until border settlements were reached with Abu Dhabi in 1974 and Oman in 1990.
- ²³ These figures are drawn from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001–2002* (London, 2001).
- ²⁴ *Ibid.* The figures for the other states are: Bahrain, 11,000 personnel and \$444m expenditure; Kuwait, 15,500 and \$3.3bn; Oman, 43,400 and \$1.7bn; Qatar, 12,330 and \$1.4bn; and the UAE, 65,000 and \$3.4bn.
- ²⁵ J.E. Peterson, *Defending Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 151.
- ²⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and Transition: US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, working draft, October 2000; online at <http://www.csis.org/burke/gulf/index.htm>, p. 73; *The Military Balance 2001–2002*, pp. 152–3. See also the draft chapters on all the Saudi Services by Cordesman in the ‘Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, draft dated 9 January 2002, online at <http://www.csis.org/burke/saudi21/index.htm>
- ²⁷ Peterson, *Defending Arabia*, p. 158; Cordesman, *The Gulf and Transition*, p. 74; and *The Military Balance 2001–2002*, pp. 152–3.
- ²⁸ US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, *Country Study on Saudi Arabia* (1992), online at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/satoc.html>; Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project’, *The Military Balance 2001–2002*, p. 153.
- ²⁹ Peterson, *Defending Arabia*, p. 157; Cordesman, *The Gulf and Transition*, p. 73; *The Military Balance 2001–2002*, pp. 152–3; and information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001. The SANG, and not the army, repulsed Iraqi forces during the Battle of al-Khafji in the run-up to the Kuwait War. Contrary to widespread belief, the SANG does not provide security for the Royal Family, apart from the Heir Apparent, Prince Abdullah, who is the SANG commander.

- ³⁰ Information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.
- ³¹ *The Military Balance 2001–2002*, p. 153; Anthony H. Cordesman, 'Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project'.
- ³² The Soviet Union had been the first country to recognise Saudi Arabia in 1927, and Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz (later to become king) had actually visited the Soviet state in 1932 before relations lapsed in 1938.
- ³³ Fouad al-Farsy, *Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), p. 294.
- ³⁴ These organisations were created in the 1960s and early 1970s largely at the insistence of King Faisal, a man of very strong religious views.
- ³⁵ US Assistant Secretary of Commerce William Lach was quoted in late 2001 as estimating that Saudi investments in the US totalled approximately \$500bn. In addition, the Kingdom was one of the US's biggest markets with more than \$4bn in imports from the US in 2000. *Gulf News* (Dubai), 6 November 2001.
- ³⁶ On 21 June 2001 an American grand jury indicted 13 Saudis and a Lebanese for the bombing at the al-Khubar Towers. At a press conference in Washington the same day US Attorney General John Ashcroft alleged that those indicted were members of Saudi Hizbollah supported and directed by officials of the Iranian government. The timing of the indictments was governed by the imminent expiry of the statute of limitations on the crime, as well as by FBI director Louis Freeh's impending retirement. Iran immediately denied the allegations. AP, 22 June 2001. The following day, the Saudi Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, told a Saudi newspaper that the Kingdom had not been given any advance warning of the step, maintained that trials must take place before Saudi judges, and averred there would be no extradition to the United States for crimes committed on Saudi soil. He also said that all but two Saudis and one Lebanese (identities not given) were in custody in Saudi Arabia. AP, 23 June 2001. There remains considerable doubt over the actual existence of a 'Saudi Hizbollah', and the indictment provided no clear evidence regarding Iranian involvement. Prince Nayif confirmed in an interview on 30 June that 11 of the 13 Saudis indicted were in Saudi prisons but reiterated that they would never be extradited. He also hinted that the trial of the 11 would begin soon. *New York Times*, 2 July 2001. The case had been marked by acrimony on both sides. The United States complained that the FBI were not given free access to detained suspects and the Saudi authorities failed to share all their information. From the Saudi point of view, the Clinton administration also withheld information, failed to keep the Saudis informed of American steps regarding the case, and the FBI acted arrogantly in the Kingdom (see Chapter 3, note 9, for similar reports on FBI attitudes in Yemen). A gossip account of the case was published by Elsa Walsh, 'Louis

Freeh's Last Case', *New Yorker*, 14 May 2001. The text of the indictments has been posted in <http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/khobar/khobarindict61901.pdf>.

- ³⁷ Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993–2000* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 16 August 2001; Report RL31083), p. 59. Saudi Arabia received the largest delivery of arms by value amongst developing countries during this period. *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ Alfred B. Prados, *Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and US Relations* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1 November 2001, Issue Brief 93113), p. 5.
- ³⁹ Information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.
- ⁴⁰ Other European deliveries over the same period totalled \$7bn while Russian, Chinese and other deliveries totalled only \$100m. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers*, p. 58.
- ⁴¹ US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998* (April 2000), online at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/wmeat98/wmeat98.html, pp. 40–41.
- ⁴² It was widely believed that the proposal never got off the ground because of Saudi opposition on the grounds that better-trained and motivated Omanis would provide a disproportionately large share of the force's personnel. On the other hand, it can be argued that the Saudis would retain

command and control functions, as they do for the present Peninsula Shield Force, and this would be the most important element in an effective force.

Chapter 2

- ¹ On the subject of succession in Saudi Arabia and the GCC, see Joseph A. Kechichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); J.E. Peterson, 'Succession in the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 173–86, and Peterson, 'The Nature of Succession in the Gulf', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 580–601.
- ² However, according to an unnamed American administration official, a Saudi intelligence survey in mid-October 2001 was said to have revealed that 95% of educated Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41 supported the cause of Osama bin Laden. *New York Times*, 27 January 2002.
- ³ World Bank, *World Development Indicators (2000)* (online at <http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000/index.htm>); information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.
- ⁴ US Embassy, Riyadh, 'Saudi Arabia: 2001 Economic Trends' (online, <http://usembassy.state.gov/riyadh/www/het01.html>).
- ⁵ World Bank, *World Development Indicators (2000)* (online).
- ⁶ Saleh Abdullah Malik, 'Rural Migration and Urban Growth in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973), p. 8; Sanaa Abd

El-Hamid Kaoud, 'Demographic Developments in Saudi Arabia During the Present Century' (Ph.D. thesis, City University, London, 1979), p. 32; information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.

⁷ The changing nature of social relations, including often pessimistic outlooks for the future, is well illustrated in the series of interviews conducted by Mai Yamani with members of Saudi Arabia's younger generation in her *Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

⁸ The emergence of a middle class in the GCC states has been analysed in J.E. Peterson, 'Change and Continuity in Arab Gulf Society', in Charles Davies (ed.), *After the War: Iraq, Iran and the Arab Gulf* (Chichester: Carden, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1990), pp. 287–312.

⁹ Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, *Achievements of the Development Plans 1390–1420 (1970–2000)* (Riyadh, 2000), p. 160.

¹⁰ Information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.

¹¹ Information received in Saudi Arabia, 1986, 1988 and February 2001. Of course, students in secular universities and other vocational institutes, as well as in Western educational institutions, may also develop Islamist inclinations. Although information on the 11 September hijackers is sketchy, it appears that some at least received some education beyond secondary-school level in disciplines not related to Islamic teaching. It should be remembered, too, that

Osama bin Laden was trained as an engineer.

¹² The Ikhwan are discussed below.

¹³ In fact, an earlier, rudimentary, consultative council had been established for the Hijaz region in the 1920s and expanded in the 1950s with Najdi representation. On the background to the Saudi *Majlis al-Shura*, see J.E. Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation* (New York: Praeger, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988; Washington Papers, no. 131), pp. 112–15.

¹⁴ A study on the second *majlis* noted that the membership held 47 doctorates and at least 44 master's degrees. Members were drawn from all regions of the country and included two Shiite. R. Hrair Dekmejian, 'Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council,' *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998), p. 210.

¹⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, 'Saudi Military Forces and the Gulf' (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 February 1999), pp. 32–3.

¹⁶ Saudi arms transfer agreements totalled \$18.8bn for 1993–96, but only \$5.7bn for the 1997–2000 period. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers*, p. 47.

¹⁷ *Achievements of the Development Plans*, p. 218.

¹⁸ The attractions of joining the Saudi security forces include securing a job for life and gaining valuable vocational training and work discipline which can be transferred later to private-sector jobs. Information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001.

¹⁹ Information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001. Much the same can be said for tribesmen from rural areas throughout the country. The hijacking of a Saudi airliner to Baghdad in 2000 was carried out by two Saudi security officers with strong tribal ties. *Ibid.* A similar hijacking took place in 1996 when three Saudis, apparently from the Bani Hilal tribe of Najd, hijacked an EgyptAir flight from Jeddah and forced it to fly to Libya; they claimed they had received a message from God about lifting the siege of Palestine and supporting Sudan. *Reuters*, 27 March 1996.

²⁰ As Brad Bourland, Chief Economist of the Saudi American Bank, has pointed out, Saudi Arabia has the largest economy in the Arab world, with a GDP in 2000 of approximately \$170bn. But its economy remains smaller than that of the metropolitan area of Washington DC (approximately \$200bn) and is dwarfed by the GDPs of France and the UK (at approximately \$1.5 trillion) and the United States (about \$9 trillion). Furthermore, he notes that for the last decade real GDP growth in the region has been only about 1% per year. Bourland, 'Opportunities and Constraints in Saudi Commercial and Economic Development', reproduced in 'GulfWire Perspectives', www.Arabialink.com.

²¹ The US Embassy in Riyadh reported that per capita GDP in both Saudi Arabia and the US was about \$28,600 in 1981. However, in 2000 US per capita GDP reached \$36,645 while

Saudi Arabia's had fallen below \$8,000. Per capita GDP for 2001 was projected at less than \$7,000. US Embassy, Riyadh, 'Saudi Arabia: 2001 Economic Trends' (online, <http://usembassy.state.gov/riyadh/wwwwhet01.html>). These figures were confirmed by discussions in Saudi Arabia during February 2001.

²² The Five-Year Development Plan for 2001–2005 forecasts that approximately one million Saudis will graduate from secondary school over the course of the plan, with some 400,000 of those going on to receive an undergraduate degree. Bourland, 'Opportunities and Constraints'.

²³ This is skilfully illustrated in Haya al-Mughni, *Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender*, 2nd ed. (London: Saqi Books, 2001).

Chapter 3

¹ *Oman News Agency* interview relayed by *Reuters*, 29 December 2001.

² *Reuters*, 30 December 2001. Prince Abdullah also condemned Israel's repression of Palestinians and asked rhetorically, 'Would the bloody oppression ... occur if Israel were confronted by a united Arab and Muslim nation?' *Ibid.*

³ Poll published in *al-Qabas* (Kuwait) as reported by *Reuters*, 19 November 2001.

⁴ But see Chapter 2, note 2.

⁵ As the term Wahabi is more common, it is used in this work. Notwithstanding media usage, Wahabism is not a sect but a reformist movement within mainstream Sunni Islam, and Wahabis follow the Hanbali

school of jurisprudence, the most conservative of the four recognised schools in Sunni Islam. As King Abd al-Aziz explained in a 1929 speech in Mecca, 'They call us the "Wahabis" and they call our creed a "Wahabi" one as if it were a special one ... and this is an extremely erroneous allegation that has arisen from the false propaganda launched by those who had ill feelings as well as ill intentions towards the movement. We are not proclaiming a new creed or a new dogm'. Quoted in al-Farsy, *Modernity and Tradition*, pp. 20–21.

⁶ The leader of the 1979 siege, Juhayman al-Utaybi came from a Najdi tribe with strong Ikhwan ties and seems to have seen his role in similar terms. On the Ikhwan and the political background to modern Saudi Arabia, see, *inter alia*, John S. Habib, *Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910–1930* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), and Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity* (London: Croom Helm; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). On Juhayman, see Joseph A. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-'Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', *Muslim World*, vol. 80, no. 1 (1990), pp. 1–16.

⁷ Eventually, however, the universities established women's branches, thus bringing female education at university level back under the control of the Ministry of

Higher Education.

⁸ There has also been a history of opposition within the minority Shiite community of the Eastern Province but, for the most part, this has been due to discriminatory treatment rather than religious extremism. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980 prompted some younger Shiite to agitate for greater Shiite freedom in an Iran-inspired Islamist framework, which then provoked a severe government response. It took several years for Riyadh to seek to redress the problem by funnelling aid to Shiite areas and rebuilding Shiite mosques.

⁹ The *Guardian* (London) reported on 8 October 2001 that Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shu'aybi issued a *fatwa* (religious legal opinion) supposedly declaring that 'Whoever supports the infidel against Muslims is considered an infidel ... it is a duty to wage *jihad* on anyone who attacks Afghanistan'. Similar declarations were issued by two other dissidents, Sulayman Alwan and Ali Khudayr. Shu'aybi died in Buraydah of a heart attack on 19 January 2002. AP, 19 January 2002.

¹⁰ On bin Laden's background, see *inter alia* US Department of State, 'Factsheet on Usama bin Laden', 14 August 1996; Madawi Al-Rasheed, 'Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition', *Current History*, vol. 95, no. 597 (January 1996), pp. 18 and 20; and Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent* (New York: St Martin's Press and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999),

p. 181.

¹¹ *Reuters* and AP, 22 April 1996; FBIS MENA, 31 May 1996, from SPA 31 May 1996. Masari's apparent statement that the US soldiers killed in the bomb attack constituted a legitimate target sparked official Saudi outrage and an attempt by the British government to deport him to the Caribbean. Masari claimed he had been misquoted and successfully petitioned the courts to stay the deportation order. *Reuters*, 16 November 1995, 6 January 1996 and 5 March 1996. A dispute shortly afterward between Masari and his collaborator Sa'd al-Faqih led to the latter's formation of a separate group, the Movement for Islamic Reform. UPI, 12 March 1996.

¹² The 19 hijackers were named by the FBI on 27 September 2001 as: (1) Khalid Almihdhar, (2) Majed Moqed, (3) Nawwaf Alhazmi, (4) Salem Alhazmi, (5) Hani Hanjour, (6) Satam M.A. Al Suqami, (7) Waleed M. Alshehri, (8) Wail M. Alshehri, (9) Mohamed Atta, (10) Abdulaziz Alomari (11) Marwan Al-Shehhi, (12) Fayez Rashid Ahmad Hasan Al Qadi Banihammad, (13) Ahmad Alghamdi, (14) Hamzah Alghamdi, (15) Mohand Alshehri, (16) Said Alghamdi, (17) Ahmad Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi, (18) Ahmad Alnami and (19) Ziad Samir Jarrah. (The names are given here in their original, sometimes garbled, form, including inconsistent transliteration). US Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Press Office, 27 September, 2001, <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/>

[pressrel01/092701hjpgic.htm](http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel01/092701hjpgic.htm).

The Saudis come from such areas as Bani Ghamid (in the western mountains), Jizan (on the Red Sea coast), Asir and Najran (in the south on the border with Yemen), a village near Medina and the city of Taif (both in the important western province of Hijaz), and the northern rural region near Jordan. One report claimed that they included the brother of a police commander, the son of a tribal sheikh, the son of a wealthy businessman, two teachers and three law graduates. *The Sunday Times* (London), 28 October 2001; *Boston Globe*, 3 March 2002.

¹³ *Arab News* (Jeddah), 14 December 2001, citing *Ukaz* (Jeddah).

¹⁴ An unnamed Saudi intelligence official was said to have estimated that 200–1,000 Saudis were involved in 2001 fighting in Afghanistan. *Washington Post*, 17 December 2001. The Saudi ambassador to Pakistan told a Saudi newspaper that some 140 Arab families, including Saudis but excluding men, were stuck on the Afghan–Pakistani border, and that the Kingdom was attempting to identify them and secure the Saudis' return to the Kingdom. BBC Monitoring Global Newslines, *al-Watan* (Abha), 17 December 2001. About the same time, the Americans claimed to have captured a Saudi associated with the proscribed Wafa Humanitarian Organisation, who, they said, was a high-ranking member of al-Qaeda. *New York Times*, 18 December 2001. Pakistani Minister of the Interior Moinuddin Haidar told *Ukaz* (Jeddah) that US and

Pakistani interrogators were questioning about 240 Saudis captured inside Pakistan after fleeing Afghanistan, and that any with links to al-Qaeda would be turned over to the FBI. Cited by *Reuters*, 5 January 2002. Saudi nationals comprised at least two of the five men identified by the FBI as major al-Qaeda suspects from a videotape recovered in Afghanistan. AP, 19 January 2002. On 28 January 2002, Saudi Minister of the Interior Prince Nayif said that about 100 Saudis were among the prisoners held by the United States at its Guantanamo base in Cuba, adding that the Kingdom wished the US to hand them over to Riyadh. *Reuters*, 28 January 2002.

¹⁵ The marginality of Osama in Saudi society (as the son of a Yemeni immigrant and thus not a true Saudi in the eyes of many) may also have been a factor in the development of his receptivity to extremism. Mamoun Fandy, in *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, discusses the role of marginality in producing dissident religious activists in the tightly cohesive society of the Kingdom.

¹⁶ President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2001, online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

¹⁷ The FBI refused to give details of the thousands of individuals it had detained. Some 50 or more men apparently of Saudi nationality were reported to be on the bureau's terrorist watch list. *Washington Post*, 15 October 2001. The release of the first 22

Saudis amongst the detainees, and then of another 12, was announced by the Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who said that most of the Saudis held in the US had been detained for violating immigration laws, traffic laws, or other minor offences. *Reuters*, 4 January 2002, citing SPA. The Saudi Embassy in Washington added that it had been contacted by over 200 Saudi families seeking information on missing relatives. *Reuters*, 14 January 2002. The embassy further announced on 31 January 2002 that another 10 prisoners had been released, and 23 more were still being held. *Arab News* (Jeddah), 1 February 2002. The comments and allegations of mistreatment of some of those released can be found in *Arab News* (Jeddah), 7 January 2002, and *Reuters*, 14 January 2002. An estimated 5,000 or more men, many of them Arabs, had been taken into custody for investigation. *Reuters*, 4 January 2002.

¹⁸ Amnesty International was quoted in the *Financial Times* (30 October 2001) as remarking 'These are exceptional times ... But public officials must not take exception to their commitments to protect human rights and the rule of law. The United States will not be well served if it erodes its own values in the name of justice.'

¹⁹ Even though Dr al-Badr al-Hazmi was completely cleared, released and allowed to take his family back to Saudi Arabia, when he flew back to the US he discovered that his visa had been cancelled without his

- knowledge. He was forced to return to Saudi Arabia a second time and obtain a new visa there. AP, 8 January 2002.
- ²⁰ AFP, 28 December 2001. The airline claimed his paperwork was improper and that he was abusive. The agent, however, continued to deny the accusations and filed complaints with appropriate government agencies. *Washington Post*, 13 January 2002.
- ²¹ The individual was Rep. Darrell Issa (California Republican). AP, 26 October 2001.
- ²² See above, Chapter 3, note 17.
- ²³ Televised comment by Senator John McCain (Arizona Republican), reported in MEED, 29 October 2001. On the same programme, Senator Joseph Lieberman (Connecticut Democrat) said the Saudis 'have satisfied their extremists within their own societies ... [and] also financed some of these organisations' and declared that the United States 'can't tolerate a nation like the Saudis ... to promulgate that hatred'. *Washington Post*, 6 November 2001.
- ²⁴ Senator Joseph Biden (Delaware Democrat) in remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations. *Reuters*, 23 October 2001.
- ²⁵ Statement to reporters by Senator Carl Levin (Michigan Democrat) on 15 January 2002. Another congressman and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter J. Goss (Florida Democrat) claimed that 'It's pretty tyrannical there'. *New York Times*, 16 January 2002.
- ²⁶ AP, 8 January 2002.
- ²⁷ For example, a later report in the *Washington Post* said that two suspected al-Qaeda members were arrested in Bahrain shortly after the attacks and sent to Saudi Arabia. Using information they provided, Saudi authorities arrested six more al-Qaeda members and provided the FBI and CIA with limited access to them. *International Herald Tribune*, 23 November 2001. Western diplomats in Riyadh were said to have confirmed that the Saudi authorities had rounded up about 400 people linked to al-Qaeda after the September attacks, although a few hundred had already left for Afghanistan. *Reuters*, 5 January 2002. Another report said that the Saudi government had asked the other GCC states to provide it with photocopies of passports of Saudis arriving from countries other than the Kingdom in an attempt to prevent Saudis disguising their return from Pakistan or Afghanistan. BBC Monitoring Global Newsline, *al-Rayah* (Doha) website, 10 January 2002.
- ²⁸ As late as November, the Saudis continued to complain that the US had provided no evidence to back their demands for action against individuals and institutions and had not clarified the identities of those on the list. One anonymous Saudi official was quoted as saying 'When [the Americans] ask us to do something, we say, "Give us the evidence". That's when they accuse us of helping the terrorists'. *New York Times*, 27 November 2001. One Saudi businessman, accused by the US Treasury Department of channelling money to al-Qaeda, filed suit in a British court to

stop the freezing of his assets in that country. *Ibid.* A high-level US delegation, composed of representatives from the Treasury, FBI, State Department and National Security Council, arrived in the Kingdom on 13 December 2001 to discuss the freezing of assets of suspected individuals and Islamic charities. These discussions apparently helped to sharpen identification of suspected culprits and enhanced cooperation. *Reuters*, 23 January 2002. In subsequent actions, Saudi officials announced action would be taken against the owners of 150 bank accounts allegedly involved in money-laundering activities (*Arab News* [Jeddah], 5 February 2002) and that four bank accounts linked to al-Qaeda had been frozen (AP, 7 February 2002). Some 230 charitable organisations exist in the Kingdom, with offices and representatives in about 55 countries, and during 2001 they collected more than one billion Saudi riyals (about \$275m) from businessmen, members of charities, *zakat* (the Islamic alms tax) and returns on investments. *Arab News* (Jeddah), 14 December 2001.

²⁹ The *Washington Post*, correcting its earlier story of 22 September 2001, reported on 28 September that Saudi Arabia would allow US troops and aircraft stationed in the Kingdom to participate in military action in Afghanistan. Secretary of State Colin Powell told a television interviewer on 23 September that the original *Washington Post* article was 'incorrect' in saying that he had protested any Saudi denial and added that the Saudis 'have

been very responsive to all of the requests we have placed on them' (US Department of State transcript of the interview, 23 September 2001, online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01092400.htm>), and an unidentified senior administration official said that the US Central Command was operating its command and control centre at the Prince Sultan base with 200 Americans working to coordinate the build-up of air power around Afghanistan (*Stars and Stripes*, 26 September 2001). Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal also denied the report on 26 September 2001, remarking 'You had the denial of the Americans about the truth of that article. Now you have the denial of the Saudis'. *Reuters*, 26 September 2001.

³⁰ See, for example, President Bush's comment during a telephone call with Prince Abdullah that 'press articles citing differences between the United States and Saudi Arabia are simply incorrect' (relayed by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer during press briefing on 25 October 2001, online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011025-5.html>). An unnamed US government official told *Reuters* (6 December 2001) that the two governments had a 'positive, good dialogue'; and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card commented after Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal's meeting with President Bush that the Saudis 'have been very cooperative. The President

expressed his appreciation' (*Washington Post*, 8 December 2001). Assistant Secretary of State William Burns remarked that 'the United States relationship with Saudi Arabia is a very strong relationship, including in security' (*Reuters* 10 December 2001); and the White House announced that President Bush had telephoned Prince Abdullah to discuss the war on terrorism and 'thanked Saudi Arabia for their friendship, cooperation and help.' (*Reuters*, 14 January 2002).

³¹ *Washington Post*, 18 January 2002. *The Economist* (26 January 2002) identified the source of this idea as Prince Talal bin Abd al-Aziz, a former minister, former exile and ruling family member, and opined that the 'leak' was for local consumption. Undeterred by US and Saudi denials, the *Washington Post* published an editorial (20 January 2002) seemingly endorsing the removal of troops. The *Guardian* (London, 27 March 2002), citing Saudi dissidents, reported that US Air Force vehicles had been observed moving equipment from Prince Sultan air base to al-Udayd air base in Qatar. The American Central Command admitted that communications and computer equipment was being moved but stressed it was to improve 'operational flexibility' of its forces in the region and did not constitute abandonment of Saudi facilities, relocation of its Gulf headquarters, or indicate an imminent attack on Iraq. *Reuters* and AP, 27 March 2002.

³² Poll carried out by Dr. James J.

Zogby, President, Arab American Institute, 24 December 2001, reprinted in *GulfWire*, 24 December. Plans for a massive media campaign in the West to improve public opinion regarding the Arab world were shelved at the GCC summit in Muscat (30–31 December 2001). *Reuters*, 31 December 2001.

³³ *The Economist*, 6–13 March 1999.

³⁴ With petrol prices in the United States near \$1 a gallon (compared to about \$4 in much of Europe) and ownership of petrol-greedy four-wheel-drive vehicles steadily increasing, it is hard to fathom the indignant belief of American consumers that they are being gouged.

³⁵ Prince Abdullah told a visiting American delegation in February 2001 that 'Israel must realize an important point: forty years ago you could not find any Arab who would shake hands with an Israeli. Today, as a result of the peace process and preparation by their leaders, it is possible for the public to accept the principle of co-existence and stability for both sides. Israel must not continue to ignore this change in attitude brought about by the peace process, and must not miss the opportunity to resolve one of the longest-running conflicts of modern times. If the opportunity is missed, the consequences will be negative'. Personal information received in Saudi Arabia, February 2001. A year later, Prince Abdullah told an American newspaper that he had drafted a speech for an Arab summit calling for 'Full withdrawal from all the occupied territories, in accord

with United Nations resolutions, including Jerusalem, for full normalization of relations' but that 'I changed my mind about delivering it when Sharon took the violence, and the oppression, to an unprecedented level'. *New York Times*, 17 February 2002.

³⁶ In the weeks after the bombing of the destroyer in Aden Harbour in October 2000, it was reported that the FBI flew its investigators by helicopter into Aden from a ship offshore without even filing a flight plan on at least one occasion. AFP, 2 November 2000. The FBI's in-country relations deteriorated so greatly that the American Ambassador in Sana'a, Barbara Bodine, banned the head of the FBI's investigation team, John O'Neill, from setting foot in Yemen. *New York Times*, 6 July 2001; *Washington Post*, 7 July 2001. O'Neill retired from the FBI in August 2001 and, ironically, took up a new job as director of security for the World Trade Center two weeks before the attacks, in which he was killed. CNN.com, 12 September 2001 (online at <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/12/victim.wtc.security>).

³⁷ For details of this indictment, Chapter 1, note 36.

³⁸ Recent statistics show that in AH 1419–1420 (1997–8), there were 2,369,000 female students in Saudi Arabia, compared to 2,405,000 males, and that 21,721 women finished their higher education that year, compared to 21,229 men. *Achievements of the Development Plans*, pp. 308, 310, 317, 320.

³⁹ For more than a year, there has

been some concern amongst analysts in the United States government that the Al Saud may be on the verge of losing control. Information received in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, 2001. The *Boston Globe* reported on 5 March 2002 that a US Central Intelligence Agency 'National Intelligence Estimate' prepared on Saudi Arabia in autumn 2002 apparently described the Al Saud regime as an 'anachronism', 'isolated' and 'inherently fragile'.

⁴⁰ Saudi caution was echoed by pronouncements by senior religious figures in the Kingdom. Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Sudays told worshippers during the Friday *khutbah* (sermon) at the Great Mosque in Mecca on 28 September 2001 that 'It would be a grave calamity when the followers of this phenomenon [of terrorism] use religion as a camouflage, because true Islam stands innocent from all that', adding that Muslims should not 'mix up the concepts of real terrorism and legitimate *jihad* (religious struggle)'. *Reuters*, 28 September 2001. Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, the Minister of the Interior, told a gathering of Saudi security officers to 'Be vigilant and reject those who try to impair security in the name of Islam', adding 'Do not forget that those who abused your country are those sitting in their caves and holes and are sorrowfully associated with Islam, and Islam stands aloft from them'. *Reuters*, 17 October 2001.

⁴¹ Heir Apparent Prince Abdullah announced in late November

2001 that civil identity cards would soon be issued to women (*Arab News*, 27 November 2001, citing *al-Hayat*, 26 November) and the first several thousand cards were issued soon after. AP, 5 December 2001; *Reuters*, 10 December 2001.

⁴² See, for example, the comments of Prince al-Walid bin Talal, the prominent Saudi businessman and investor, in an interview that 'Inevitably what's going on in America will scare Saudis for sure ... not only from investing in America but in going to America. All Arab names are ruined in America right now. If an Arab goes there he is a liability, he is not welcome.' *Reuters*, 23 October 2001. One report said that at least 300 Saudi students returned home after 11 September, many of whom attributed their decision to harassment by officials and the American population. American consular officials admitted that the number of Saudi visa applications in late 2001 was running far below the 60,000 issued for the year up to October 2001. *New York Times*, 7 December 2001. Many of these, however, intended to return for the spring semester, although mostly without their families. Anecdotal evidence from travel agents in the Gulf suggested that many Saudis were changing travel plans for the Id al-Fitr end-of-Ramadan holiday from the US or Europe to such destinations as Beirut, Egypt, Morocco, Malaysia and India. *Gulf News* (Dubai), 12 December 2001. Other sources estimated that more than 40,000 Saudis would not be taking

their holidays in the US during 2002. *Arab News* (Jeddah), 15 February 2002. Another report said that investment capital worth \$24bn had been withdrawn back to Saudi Arabia between 11 September and the end of November. *Arab News*, 2 January 2002. Subsequent reports contradicted this, with Prince Abdullah bin Faisal bin Turki, Chairman of Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, guessing that only about \$4bn had returned, and at least one US bank claimed that there had been no withdrawal of US-based assets. *Reuters*, 25 January 2002.

⁴³ At the time of writing, an American attack on Iraq seemed to be just sabre-rattling. Still, President Bush's hint in mid-November that Iraq could be next if it did not allow the return of UN inspectors was followed in mid-December by the comment of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to *al-Hayat* (London) that 'the world and Iraq will live better without Saddam Hussein in power' (cited by AFP, 20 December 2001) and the inclusion of Iraq in the 'evil axis' in President Bush's State of the Union address. More hints by senior administration figures followed in the first half of 2002, and a tour of the GCC states by US Vice-President Richard Cheney in March 2002 was said to have been an unsuccessful attempt to drum up support for an attack on Iraq.

⁴⁴ This was echoed in an interview given by Prince Turki al-Faisal, shortly after he stepped down as chief of Saudi intelligence. 'You target Saddam Hussein

and no one will boo or hiss or object', he was quoted as saying. 'But bombings like the ones we saw against Iraq in 1998, or like the ones we've seen now in Afghanistan, with so-called collateral bombings, when bombs hit innocent people, will have strong resonance and very bad implications for relations with the West'. *International Herald Tribune*, 22 November 2001.

⁴⁵ *Reuters*, 16 February 2002.

⁴⁶ Statement reproduced in 'GulfWire Voices of the Region', 4–10 June 2001, www.Arabialink.com. The voicing of Saudi displeasure with US support for Israel against the Palestinians prompted former President George Bush to telephone the Saudi Heir Apparent Prince Abdullah in late June to reassure him that his son, President George W. Bush, 'was going to do the right thing' in the Middle East. *New York Times*, 15 July 2001.

⁴⁷ WAM, 3 July 2001. Similar sentiments were expressed by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal Al Saud on 5 September 2001, when he told a press conference in Amman that 'It is time especially for the United States to assume its responsibility and prevent Israeli aggression against the Arab world'. *Reuters*, 5 September 2001. The day before the 11 September attacks, the Saudi-owned newspaper *al-Sharq al-Awsat* reported that the issue had caused the Saudi government to put off the annual talks of the joint Saudi–US military committee in late August. *Reuters*, 10 September

2001.

⁴⁸ For example, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said on 9 November 2001 that the Saudi government was 'angrily frustrated' that the Bush administration had not initiated a new peace initiative and declared that President Bush could not become an 'honest broker' in the peace process until he met with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. Bush refused to see Arafat on the same day, even though both were in New York for UN General Assembly meetings. *New York Times*, 9 November 2001.

Conclusions

¹ Examples of potential 'bridge-building' projects might be the inclusion of Iraq in the proposed Iran–Kuwait fresh-water pipeline and in the proposed Gulf gas grid or gas pipeline from Qatar to Kuwait, and greater Iraqi use of Kuwaiti territory for access to the Gulf. In early 2002, Kuwait announced it was creating a committee to promote development cooperation between Kuwait and Iran, including railway links between the Gulf and beyond to Central Asia. *Reuters*, 8 April 2002.

² For example, better Iran–UAE (and, especially, better Iran–GCC) relations might open the way for a face-saving compromise over the three islands of the Gulf claimed by the UAE but unilaterally occupied by Iran.

³ Such efforts almost inevitably lead to enduring bitterness, as shown by the example of the

1975 Algiers Accord on the division of the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq. Iraq's belief that it had been made to sign the accord under duress was one justification for the attack on Iran in 1980.

⁴ The powerful role of satellite television in disseminating information and ideas was clearly shown during the American war in Afghanistan, when Qatar's controversial Jazeera station, the only in-country television presence, broadcast information on the war and statements by Osama bin Laden throughout the Middle East.

⁵ While Israel may, *in extremis*, serve as a base for US force projection, it is a liability in political and financial terms for the US in the Middle East – and of course can play no positive role in a wider Islamic world stretching from Pakistan to Malaysia.

